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1. Review of the Syntactical Specification of Content 
 
 Gemes (1994) offered two equivalent syntactic definitions of so-called 
basic (logical) content for a generic propositional language L~v&→, hereafter L.  
The prime motivation for the theory of content was to construct a notion of 
consequence that would not allow arbitrary disjunctions to count as part of the 
contents of their disjuncts; for instance, to disallow '(pvq)' from counting as part of 
the content of 'p'.  Gemes (1994) was framed in terms of "basic content" rather 
than simply "content" because otherwise it would have yielded an account 
according to which disjunctions of content parts did not count as content parts. I 
have come to consider this result acceptable, perhaps even desirable.1  So for 
the remainder of this paper I will treat Gemes (1994) as if it gave an account of 
content rather than basic content.  
 
 Let 'α', 'ß' and 'ø' be variables for wffs, and, were specified, sets of wffs, of the 
propositional language L;  '├' stand for the classically defined relation of being a 
syntactical consequence; and αdnf be a canonical Boolean disjunctive normal form of 
arbitrary (contingent) L wff α in the essential vocabulary of α.  For instance, presuming 'p', 
'q' and 'r' are atomic wffs of L, ((pvq)&(rv~r))dnf is '(p&q)v(p&~q)v(~p&q)'.
2  Then the 
following, using 'ß├cα' to abbreviate 'α is a (syntactically specified) content part of ß' and 
‘ß├/cα’ to abbreviate 'α is not a (syntactically specified) content part of ß’, is a variant of 
one of Gemes (1994)'s definitions of content for wffs of L    
 
(D1) ß├cα =df (i) α and ß are contingent, (ii) ß├α, and (iii) each disjunct 
of αdnf is a sub-conjunction  of some disjunct of ßdnf.3
  
                                                          
1  A referee from this journal pointed out that since the content relationship is closed 
under logical equivalence if one counts 'pvq' as part of the content of 'p&q' then one must 
equally, and contra many people's natural intuitions, count '~p→q' as part of the content 
of 'p&q'.  The same referee also helpfully pointed me in the direction of Stelzner (1992). 
2 For a more precise definition see Gemes (1994).  Note,canonical disjunctive normal 
forms contain no redundant, that is logically equivalent, disjuncts.  The notion of dnf 
remains undefined for non-contingent wffs. 
3 Gemes (1994) actually gave two syntactic definitions of content for L, (BCPL1) and 
(BCPL2) of Gemes (1994), and proved they were extensionally equivalent.  (D1) here is 
similar to (BCPL2) of Gemes (1994) which, replacing Gemes' (1994) 'α<bß' notation 
with our current 'ß├cα' notation, reads 
 
ß├cα =df (i) α and ß are contingent, (ii) ß├α, and  (iii) there is no µ such that µ is a 
proper sub-disjunction of αdnf and ß├µ. 
 
A proof of the equivalence of this definition and our current (D1) is presented in an 
Appendix below.  The (D1) definition is used here because it lends itself to a ready 
transformation to a model-theoretic analog and because it, unlike (BCPL1) and (BCPL2), 
allows for a facile proof of transitivity. 
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In (D1), while 'α' ranges over single wffs, the variable 'ß' may be interpreted as 
ranging over both single wffs and sets of wffs. So (D1) may be taken as given 
both the contents of wffs and the content of theories, where theories are taken to 
be sets of wffs.  From here on we shall generally exclude mention of the notion of 
(D1) and subsequent definitions giving the content of theories and concentrate 
on the notion of the content of wffs.  For more on the content of theories see 
Gemes (1993). 
 
 Some examples of content relationships for wffs of L: 
 
                  p├cp                                                 p├/c(pvq) 
                             p├c(p&(rv~r))                      p&(pvq)├/c(pvq) 
              (p&(rv~r))├cp                                         (p&q)├/c(pvq) 
                      (p&q)├cp                                            (pq)├/c(p→q) 
                      (p&q)├cq                                         (p&q)├/(pq)                    
         ((p&q)v(r&s))├c(pvr)                               p&(qvr)├/cqv(p&r) 
                ~p&(pvq)├cq                                                q├/c(p→q) 
 
 As noted in Gemes (1994) this type of definition amounts to saying that α 
is a content part of ß, iff α and ß are contingent and α is the strongest 
consequence (up to logical equivalence) of ß constructible using just the 
essential atomic wffs occurring in α.4  Furthermore such definitions readily admit 
of a mechanical decision procedure [Cf. Gemes (1994), p.606 and pp.610-611]. 
 
 
 
2. A Model-Theoretic Definition of Content for L. 
 
 We may easily create a model-theoretic analog of (D1).  Such accounts 
are read of from (D1) since it makes use of disjunctive normal forms and such 
forms have obvious model-theoretic analogs.    
  
 Each disjunct of the dnf form of a wff α may be seen as corresponding to 
an "α-relevantly specified model of α", or, more simply, an "α-relevant model of 
                                                          
4 Indeed, this strongest-consequence formulation is a paraphrase of the definition BCPL1 
given in Gemes (1994).  Later in section 7. we shall see that this restriction to 
consequences constructible in the essential vocabulary of α makes our definition of 
content less suitable than it might be for the purpose of giving a formal account of 
Gricean conversational maxims.  If we dropped the reference to essential vocabulary we 
would have a notion of content which would not guarantee that logical equivalents wffs 
have the same content relationship to other wffs.  For instance, such a definition would 
have 'p' but not 'p&(qv~q)' be part of the content of 'p&q'.  Such a failure to treat logical 
equivalents equivalently would wreck havoc when applied to problems in the philosophy 
of science, for instance, in defining confirmation relations.  However for other purposes it 
would be a boon. 
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α".  For arbitrary L wff α, an α-relevant model of α is a model of α that specifies 
values for all and only those propositional variables whose truth values on some 
model or other are relevant to the truth value of  α.  
 
 For instance where α is '(pvq)', αdnf is '(p&q)v(p&~q)&(~p&q)'.  Here the 
first disjunct corresponds to that α-relevant model of α which assigns 'p' the value 
true and 'q' the value true and makes no other assignments (to propositional 
variables).  The second disjunct corresponds to that α-relevant model of α  that 
assigns 'p' the value true and 'q' the value false and makes no other 
assignments.  The third disjunct corresponds to the α-relevant model of α where 
'p' is assigned the value false and 'q' true and makes no other assignments.  Now 
suppose ß is '(pvq)&r'.  Then ßdnf is '(p&q&r)v(p&
~q&r)v(~p&q&r)'.  The first 
disjunct of ßdnf corresponds to the ß-relevant model of ß which assigns 'p', 'q' 
and 'r' the value true and makes no other assignments. The second disjunct of 
ßdnf corresponds to the ß-relevant model of ß which assigns 'p' and 'r' the value 
true, and 'q' the value false and makes no other assignments.  The third disjunct 
of ßdnf corresponds to the ß-relevant model of ß which assigns 'p' the value false 
and 'q' and 'r' the value true makes no other assignments.  Thus we have the 
following table summarizing the various relevant models for our designated 
values for α and ß: 
 
 α-relevant model of α          ß-relevant models of ß 
         1. p:T q:T                      1. p:T q:T r:T 
         2. p:T q:F                      2. p:T q:F r:T 
         3. p:F q:T                      3. p:F q:T r:T 
   
Now given our specified values of α and ß, α is a content part of ß according to 
(D1).  According to (D1), where α is a content part of ß each disjunct of αdnf is a 
sub-conjunction of some disjunct of ßdnf.  In other words, and as seen in the 
above table, where α is a content part of ß each α-relevant model of α is a sub-
model of some ß-relevant model of ß, or, equivalently, each α-relevant model of 
α can be expanded to a ß-relevant model of ß. 
 
 Here already we have the makings of a model theoretic account of 
content.  To make it more precise we need to give an exact account of what, for 
any wff α an α-relevant model of α is.  To do this we need to introduce the notion 
of a partial interpretation and some other notions. 
 
 A partial interpretation of L is a valuation function which assigns to at least 
one propositional variable of L one of the two truth values true (T) and false (F) 
and assigns to no propositional variable of L both T and F. 
 
 We can take a full interpretation of L to be a partial interpretation that 
assigns a truth value to every propositional variable of L.  Truth under a full 
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interpretation is defined in the usual way.5  Where wff α is true under full 
interpretation P we say P is a model of α. 
 
 A propositional variable ß is relevant to wff α iff there is some model P of α 
such that there is some interpretation P' which differs from P in and only in the 
value P' assigns to ß and P' is not a model of α. 
   
 An (full or partial) interpretation P' is an extension of partial interpretation P 
iff for any propositional variable ß, if P assigns T(F) to ß then so does P'.  Where 
interpretation P' is an extension of interpretation P we may say that P is a sub-
model of P'. 
 
(D2.1) P is an α-relevant model of wff α of L=df  P is a partial  interpretation 
of L such that P assigns values to each of and only those 
propositional variables relevant to α and is such that for any full 
interpretation P' which is an extension of P, P' is a model of α. 
 
 Now, assuming the classical relation of semantical consequence (╞) and 
using 'ß╞cα' to abbreviate 'α is a (semantically specified) content part of ß' and 
‘ß╞/cα’ to abbreviate 'α is a not a (semantically specified) content part of ß', we 
are at last in a position to give a model theoretic definition of content part for wffs 
of L:  
 
(D2) ß╞cα =df α and ß are contingent, ß╞α, and every α-relevant model of α 
has an extension which is a ß-relevant model of ß. 
 
Alternatively, we might say that ß╞cα, where α and ß are contingent, ß╞α, and 
every α-relevant model of α is a sub-model of some ß-relevant model of ß. 
 
 According to (D2), for instance, '(pvq)' is not a content part of 'p', since that 
'(pvq)'-relevant model of '(pvq)' which assigns 'p' the value F and 'q' the value T 
and makes no other assignments has no extension which is a 'p'-relevant model 
of 'p'. 
 
 According to (D2), for instance, 'p' is part of the content of '(p&q)'. There is 
only one 'p'-relevant model for 'p', namely that which assigns T to 'p' and makes 
no other assignments and that model has an extension to a '(p&q)'-relevant 
model of '(p&q)', namely that which assigns 'p' the value T and 'q' the value T and 
makes no other assignments. 
 
 More generally, (D2) yields the same results as (D1) since we have the 
correctness and completeness theorem: 
 
5
 We give no definition of truth under a partial interpretation since no use is made of 
such a notion here. 
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Theorem 1:  For any wffs α and ß of L, ß├cα iff ß╞cα. 
 
Proof: Cf. definitions (D1) and (D2) and note that (i) each α-relatively specified 
model of α uniquely characterizes and is uniquely characterized by a unique 
disjunct of αdnf, (ii) each ß-relatively specified model of ß uniquely characterizes 
and is uniquely characterized by a unique disjunct of ßdnf and (iii) an α-relatively 
specified model m of α has an extension which is a ß-relatively specified model 
m' of ß iff the disjunct of αdnf which characterizes m is a sub-conjunction of the 
disjunct of ßdnf that characterizes m'. 
 
 The classical consequence relation is both reflexive and transitive. The 
content relation defined by (D2) and (D1) is clearly reflexive for any contingent 
wff α, thus we have 
 
Theorem 2:  For any contingent wff α of L, α╞cα. 
 
Proof: Trivial. 
 
 Gemes (1994) made fairly heavy going of a proof of transitivity.  (D2) 
makes for a transparent proof of transitivity which applies equally for definitions 
for more sophisticated languages than L.   
 
Theorem 3:  For any wffs α, ß and ø of L, if ß╞cα and α╞cø then ß╞cø 
 
Proof: Assume ß╞cα and α╞cø. Then ß, α, and ø are all contingent; ß╞α and α╞ø; every ø-relevant model of ø is a sub-model of some α-relevant model of α; 
and every α-relevant model of α is a sub-model of some a ß-relevant model of ß.  
So, ß╞ø.  Further, since the relation of being a sub-model is transitive, every ø-
relevant model of ø is a sub-model of some ß-relevant model of ß.  So ß╞cø. 
 
The content relationship allows for substitution of classical equivalents.  In other 
words 
 
Theorem 4: For any wffs α, ß, σ, and ϕ of L, where α╡╞β and σ╡╞ϕ,   ß╞cϕ 
iff α╞cσ. 
 
Proof:  This follows from the fact that any two classically equivalent wffs α and ß 
share the same relevant propositional variables and hence, being 
equivalent, a partial interpretation P is an α-relevant model of α iff P is a ß-
relevant model of ß. 
 
 
 
3.  Content for a Generic Quantification Language Without Identity  
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In Gemes (1994) a syntactically based definition of content for wffs of a generic 
quantificational language without identity was briefly considered.   
 
Consider the generic classical quantificational language L'.  The vocabulary of L' 
is limited to an infinite stock of individual constants, 'a', 'a1', 'a2', ... ; an infinite 
stock of individual variables 'x', 'x1', 'x2, ... ; an infinite stock of predicate letters of 
varying degrees (one-placed, two-paced, etc.), 'F', 'G', 'H', 'F1, G1, H1, ... ; the 
sentential connectives '~', '&', 'v', '→' and '≡'; and the grouping indicators '(' and ')'. 
The wffs of L' are formed from the elements of L's vocabulary in the usual ways.  
The notions of derivable consequence (├), semantical consequence (╞), 
contradiction, tautology, atomic wffs, basic wffs, free variables and closed wffs 
are defined as usual.  Hereafter, unless directly specified, we shall use the term 
'wffs' to refer to closed wffs.  We shall use the Greek letters 'α', 'ß', and 'ø' and 
subscripted variants as meta-variables ranging alternatively over open wffs, 
closed wffs, quantifiers and individual constants of L', relying on specific 
indications and/or context to indicate the range in particular cases. 
 
 To define content for wffs of L we make use of the purely propositional 
fragment of L and the resources of propositional infinitary logics applied to that 
fragment of L.  In particular, we allow for wffs of infinite length. 
 
 To form Dev(α) for arbitrary L' wff α (1) Put α into prenex normal form, (2) 
Where ø1.....øn A is the resultant wff, with ø1.....øn being a string of n, n≥0, 
quantifiers and A being a quantifier free wff, where n>0 eliminate the left-most 
quantifier øn, and (i) if øn is a universal quantifier replace A with an infinite 
conjunction such that each conjunct is the result of replacing in A all occurrences 
of the variable governed by øn by a given constant of L' and such that for each 
constant of L' there is one and only one such conjunct, or (ii) if øn is an existential 
quantifier replace A with an infinite disjunction such that each disjunct is the 
result of replacing in A all occurrences of the variable governed by øn by a given 
constant of L' and such that for each constant of L' there is one and only one 
such disjunct, (3) keep repeating step (2) until a quantifier free wff, being Dev(α), 
results. 
 
 Let αdnf, that is the canonical disjunctive normal form of α, be the result of 
putting Dev(α) into a canonical Boolean disjunctive normal form in the essential 
vocabulary of Dev(α).   
 
 Then our old definition  
 
(D1) ß├cα =df (i) α and ß are contingent, (ii) ß├α, and (iii) each disjunct of αdnf is a sub-conjunction of some disjunct of ßdnf, 
 
serves to define content for wffs of L'.  (D1) applied to wffs of L' yields the result 
that 'Fa1' is a content part of '(x)Fx'.  The dnf of 'Fa1' is 'Fa1' and the dnf of '(x)Fx' 
is 'Fa1&Fa2& ..... & Fan &.... &' and clearly each disjunct of the former - we take 
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'Fa1' to be a disjunction with a single disjunct - is a sub-conjunction of the  
 
 Some examples of content relationships for wffs of L':      
 
                              (x)Fx├cFa1             (x)Fx├/c(x)(FxvGx)   
                   (x)(Fx&Gx)├c(x)Fx           (x)Fx├/c(∃x)Fx 
                   (x)(Fx&Gx)├c(Fa&Gb)          Fa├/c(∃x)Fx 
 
 Since the (D1) definition of content applied to wffs of the quantificational 
language L' makes use of the classical notion of consequence applied to 
quantificational wffs it is not generally decidable.  However the content relation, 
like the classical consequence relation, is decidable for the purely monadic 
fragment of L'. 
 
 Where α and ß are monadic wffs of L' we can use standard procedures to 
check whether α and ß are contingent and whether ß├α.  If one of α or ß is not 
contingent or ß├/α then α is not a content part of ß.  Otherwise, to determine 
whether α is a content part of ß (1) form L'- from L' by deleting from L' all 
individual constants save those occurring in α or ß and then adding any two extra 
constants appearing in neither α or ß; then (2) form Dev(ß/L'-) and Dev(α/L'-) 
according to the recipe given above for forming Dev(ß) and Dev(α) substituting in 
the recipe all reference to L'  with reference to L'-; then (3) form αdnf:L'- and 
ßdnf:L'- by putting Dev(ß/L-) and Dev(α/L-), respectively, into a canonical 
Boolean disjunctive form in their essential vocabulary; then (4) check whether 
each disjunct of αdnf:L'- is a sub-conjunction of some disjunct of ßdnf:L'-.  If so 
then α is a content part of ß otherwise it is not.  Note, since both αdnf:L'- and 
ßdnf:L'- are both finite disjunctions of finite conjunctions of atomic wffs and 
negated atomics wffs step (4) is mechanically decidable.  
  
 This decision procedure for the monadic case suggests a method for 
defining content for all wffs of L' which does not make recourse to the use of 
infinitary logics.  To see this imagine that we restrict αdnf and ßdnf as defined 
above to finite subsets of atomic wffs occurring in αdnf and ßdnf.  More 
particularly, where ø is any arbitrary wff of L' and σ is any non-empty set of 
atomic wffs of L' including at least one atomic wff occurring in ødnf, let ødnf:σ be 
ødnf less all conjuncts containing atomic wffs not occurring in σ.  For instance 
(x)~Fxdnf:{Fa,Fb} is '~Fa&~Fb'.  Then we might define content for wffs of L' as 
follows 
 
(D1.1) ß├cα =df (i) α and ß are contingent, (ii) ßα, and (iii) for any finite set σ 
of atomic wffs of L' including at least one atomic wff 
occurring in αdnf, each disjunct of αdnf:σ is a sub-
conjunction of some  disjunct of ßdnf:σ.  
 
Since σ of (D1.1) is restricted to finite sets of atomic wffs in every case αdnf:σ 
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and ßdnf:σ are wffs of finite length. 
 
(D1.1) applied to wffs of L' is equivalent to (D1) applied to wffs of L'.   
 
 
4. A Model-Theoretic Definition of Content for L'. 
 
We may with a bit of work create a model-theoretic analog of (D1) for wffs of L'.  
To do this we need to construe the quantifiers of L' substitutionally and construct 
our model theory accordingly.  In particular, an interpretation or model for L' will 
be an assignment to each of the (closed) atomic wffs of L' of one and only one of 
the truth values T and F.  A universally quantified wff α will count as true in a 
given model of L' iff each substitution instance of α counts as true in that model, 
and an existentially quantified wff will count as true in a given model of L' iff some 
substitution instance of it counts as true in that model. 
 
On such a reading each disjunct of αdnf for arbitrary L' wff α will correspond an 
"α-relevantly specified model of α", that is, a model of α that specifies values for 
all and only those atomic wffs whose truth values on some model or other are 
relevant to the truth value of α 
.  
Let us try to be a little more precise. 
 
A partial interpretation of L is a valuation function which assigns to at least one 
atomic wff of L' one of the two truth values true (T) and false (F) and assigns to 
no atomic wff L both T and F. 
 
We take a full interpretation of L to be a partial interpretation that assigns a truth 
value to every atomic wff of L'.  Truth under a full interpretation is defined in the 
usual way with the appropriate substitution type clauses for quantificational wffs.  
Where wff α is true under full interpretation P we say P is a model of α.   
 
 A (full or partial) interpretation P' is an extension of partial interpretation P 
iff for any atomic wff ß, if P assigns T(F)to ß then so does P'.  Where P' is an 
extension of P and P is not an extension of P' we say P is a proper sub-
interpretation of P'. 
 
 An atomic wff ß is relevant to wff α iff for some partial interpretation P, P 
assigns a value to ß and for every full interpretation P', if P' is an extension of P 
then P' is a model of α, and there is no proper sub-interpretation P'' of P, such 
that for every full interpretation of P''' that is an extension of P'', P''' is a model of 
α. 
 
(D2.2) P is an α-relevant model of wff α of L' =df  P is a partial interpretation 
of L' such that P is assigns values to each of and only those atomic 
wffs relevant to α and is such that for any full interpretation P' which 
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is an extension of P, P' is a model of α. 
 
 Given these preliminaries our old definition  
 
(D2) ß╞cα =df α and ß are contingent, ß╞, and every α-relevant model of α 
has an extension which is a ß-relevant model of ß, 
 
serves for wffs of L'.    
 
According to (D2), for instance,  'Fa' is a  content part of '(x)Fx'.  The only 'Fa'-
relevant model of 'Fa' is that which assigns 'Fa' the value T and makes no other 
assignments.  By adding only the assignment T to every other wff of the form 'F' 
that model may be extended to an '(x)Fx'-relevant model of '(x)Fx'.   
  
 The proof of Theorem 1 above counts equally as a correctness and 
completeness proof for definitions (D1) and (D2) applied to wffs of L'.  Thus we 
have  
 
Theorem 5:  For any wffs α and ß of L', ß├cα iff ß╞cα. 
 
Similarly, the reflexivity, transitivity and substitution proofs of theorems 2, 3 and 4 
work for definition (D2) applied to wffs of L'.  Thus we have  
 
Theorem 6:  For any contingent wff α of L', α╞cα. 
 
Theorem 7: For any wffs α and ß of L' if ß╞cα and α╞cø then  ß╞cø 
 
Theorem 8: For any wffs α, ß, σ and ø of L', where α ╞σ and ß╞ø, ß╞cα iff 
ø╞cσ.  
 
Note, while in constructing our model theoretic definition of content part for wffs 
of L' we have construed the quantifiers of L' substitutionally, we may otherwise 
give them a fully objectual reading.  That is to say, one can read, for instance, 
'(x)Fx' as stating that every object in the domain of quantification has property F, 
while using recourse to a substitutional reading in order to determine the content 
parts of '(x)Fx'.  While this dual treatment may seem infelicitous I believe that a 
model theoretic definition of content which eschews the use of the substitutional 
interpretation can be constructed along the following lines suggested by Philip 
Kremer. 
 
 Let M be any standard objectual denumerable model of arbitrary wff α of 
L'.  Where D is the domain of M and E is any finite sub-domain of M we construct 
α(E) as follows: (1) form L'+ from L' by  supplementing L' with a set I of new 
individual constants containing one new constant for each member of D not 
assigned by M to some individual constant of L', (2) form M+ from M by adding to 
M an assignment of each element of D not assigned by M to an individual 
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constant of L' to a unique individual constant of I, (3) construct Dev(α) by 
replacing α with its non-quantificational equivalent in L+ using the recipe given in 
Section 3 above, substituting reference to L'+ for all references to L', (4) form 
Dev(α (E)) from Dev(α) by removing from Dev(α) each atomic wff containing a 
constant which M+ assigns to an individual that is not a member of E - where 
every atomic wff occurring in Dev(α) contains some constant assigned by M+ to 
some individual that is not a member of E, Dev(α (E)) is {/}, then (5) construct α 
(E) by putting Dev(α (E)) in a canonical Boolean disjunctive normal form in the 
essential vocabulary of Dev(α (E)) - where Dev(α (E)) is {/} then α (E) is {/}.    
 
 We might say that where M is a model of wff α with domain D, and E is a 
sub-domain of D, α (E) tells us in a propositional form all the truth wholly about E 
contained in α.  We then have the preliminary definition: 
 
(D2.2) ß╞cα relative to model M of α and ß =df α and ß are  contingent, ß╞α, 
and for every finite sub-domain  E of M's domain D, where α (E) is not 
{/}, ß(E)├cα (E) by (D2). 
 
Note, ß(E) and α (E) belong to the purely propositional fragment of L'+ and 
hence, besides logical operators and grouping indicators, contain only individual 
constants and predicates letters .  We apply (D2) to wffs of this fragment of L'+ 
on the model of our application of (D2) to wffs of the propositional language L, 
making suitable adjustments to the notion of interpretations,  partial 
interpretation, and α-relevant model ofα.6    
  
 We are now in a position to offer the following objectually based definition 
of content: 
 
(D2.3) ß╞cα =df α and ß are contingent, ß╞α, and for any model M  of ß and α, ß├cα relative to M. 
 
I conjecture that (D2.3), or something very close to it, applied to wffs of L' is 
demonstrably equivalent to (D2) applied to wffs of L'. 
 
 
 
5. A Model-Theoretic Definition of Content for L' with  Identity 
 
 Gemes (1994) made fairly heavy weather of the question of how to define 
content for wffs of languages with an identity operator.  However since we are 
                                                          
6 Most importantly, full interpretations for this propositional fragment of L' are taken to 
be assignments of n-tuples of entities from the relevant domain D to each n-placed 
predicate of L' and assignments of individuals from D to each individual constant of L'.  
Interpretations here are strictly objectual rather than substitutional. 
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making use here of the resources of model theory rather than the purely 
syntactical resources of Gemes (1994) we have the means for a more smooth 
approach.   
 
 Let L'= be L' supplemented with the identity predicate '='.  Then, given a 
little fiddling, (D2) can operate as a definition of content for wff of L'=.  The 
notions of a full interpretation, extension, and an α-relevant model of α (Cf. 
(D2.1) above) can be defined as for L'.  We need however to amend our 
definition of a partial interpretation and what it is for arbitrary atomic wff ß to be 
relevant to arbitrary wff α. 
 
 A partial interpretation of L'= is a valuation function which assigns to at 
least one atomic wff of L'= one of the two truth values true (T) and false (F) and 
assigns to no atomic wff of L'= both T and F and fulfills the following conditions 
regarding identity statements 
(i) No identity statement 
┌α=α┐ is assigned the value F. 
           (ii) For any identity statement 
┌α=ß┐, if ┌α=ß┐ is assigned  
                 a value then 
┌
ß=α┐ is assigned the same value. 
          (iii) For any pair of identity statements 
┌α=ß┐ and ┌ß=ø┐ if 
┌α=ß┐ and ┌ß=ø┐ are assigned T then so is ┌α=ø┐. 
          (iv) If an atomic wff α is assigned a truth value V and ß is a 
constant that occurs in α, then for any individual constant 
ø, if 
┌
ß=ø
┐
 is assigned the value T, then the value V is 
assigned to any atomic wff α' which differs from α only in 
that one or more occurrence of the individual constant ß is 
replaced by ø. 
 
An atomic wff ß is relevant to wff α iff for some partial interpretation P, every full 
interpretation P' that is an extension of P is a model of α and each such 
extension of P assigns the same value to ß, and there is no proper sub-
interpretation P'' of P, such that for every full interpretation of P''' that is an 
extension of P'', P''' is a model of α. 
 
Given these preliminaries,  
 
(D2) ß╞cα =df α and ß are contingent, ß╞α, and every α-relevant model of α 
has an extension which is a ß-relevant model of ß, 
 
is applicable to wffs of L'=.  
 
Some examples of content for wffs of L'=: 
 
                             (x)Fx╞cFa1              (x)Fx╞/c(x)(FxvGx) 
                Fa1&(a1=a2)╞cFa2           a1=a2╞/c(Fa1v~Fa2) 
                    Fa1&~Fa2╞ca1≠a2            Fa1╞/ca1=a2→Fa2 
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 Note, 'Fa1 is relevant to 'a1=a2→Fa2'.  To see this consider that partial 
interpretation I that assigns T to the atomic wff 'Fa1' and makes no other 
assignments.  Every full interpretation that is an extension of I is a model for 
'a1=a2→Fa2' and assigns the same value, namely T, to 'Fa1,  and I has in fact 
no proper sub-interpretations.  Also, 'a1=a2' is relevant to 'Fa1&~Fa2'.  To see 
this consider that partial interpretation, call it I', that assigns the vale T to 'Fa1' 
and the value F to 'Fa2'.  Now there is no proper sub-interpretation of I' such that 
every full extension of that sub-interpretation is a model of 'Fa1&~Fa2', and, 
further, every full extension of I assigns the same value, namely F, to 'a1=a2'. 
 
 
 
6. Alternative Notions I:  Stelzner Consequences 
 
 The notion of content explored here and in Gemes (1994) is specifically 
designed to be employed in developing certain projects in the philosophy of 
science.  Thus Gemes (1993) uses the notion of content to explicate the notion of 
hypothetico-deductive confirmation and the notion of natural axiomatizations; 
Gemes (1994a) uses it to clarify Friedman's notion of unification as reduction.  
Other non-standard notions of consequence have of course been introduced for 
other purposes. 
 
 In Gemes (1994) the content notion of consequence was briefly compared 
with Parry's notion of analytical entailment, Relevance logic entailment and 
Grimes's notion of narrow consequence.  Relevance logics generally 
countenance 'pvq' as a consequence of 'p'.  While analytical entailment does not 
hold between 'p' and 'pvq', it does hold between p's classical equivalent 'p&(pvq)' 
and '(pvq).  Furthermore, 'p&q' analytically entails 'pv~q'.  'pv~q' also counts as a 
narrow consequence of 'p&q'.  These and other results render the notions of 
analytical entailment, relevant entailment, and narrow consequence as less 
useful than the notion of content in serving those ends for which the notion of 
content was developed - for more on this see Gemes (1994). 
 
 We shall now consider a notion of consequence that is nearer to our 
above defined notion of content part. 
 
 As mentioned earlier, Gemes (1994) took definitions such as (D1) to give 
accounts of basic content rather than full content because they did not allow that 
disjunctions of content parts always count as content parts.  For instance, while 
both the L wffs 'p' and 'q' count as content parts, by (D1) and (D2), of the L wff 
'p&q', 'pvq' does not, according to (D1) and (D2),  count as a content part of 
'p&q'.  Now in fact it is easy to construct an account which takes (non-
tautologous) conjunctions of content parts as content parts.  We need merely 
refine our notion of disjunctive normal form into the notion of a minimal 
disjunctive normal form.  Thus where the dnf of '(r&(pvq)' is 
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'(p&q&r)v(p&~q&r)v(~p&q&r)' its minimal disjunctive form, mdnf, is '(p&r)v(q&r)'.   
 
 The disjuncts of arbitrary (consistent) wff α's mdnf are each and every 
(consistent) conjunction ß of atomic wffs and negated atomic wffs, such that ß 
entails α and no proper sub-conjunction of ß entailsα.7  We might see an 
arbitrary disjunct ß of arbitrary α's dnf as specifying a world where α is true and 
where that world is specified only in terms of propositional variables relevant α.  
On the other hand we might see an arbitrary disjunct ß of arbitrary α's mdnf as 
specifying a minimal world for the truth of α. 
 
 Should we desire a definition of content that counts disjunctions of content 
parts as content parts we could simply replace the terms 'αdnf' and 'ßdnf' in (D1) 
with the terms 'αmdnf' and 'ßmdnf' where the later designate, respectively, the 
minimal disjunctive normal form of α and the minimal disjunctive form of ß.  Thus 
we have the following definition for wffs of L, 
 
(D3) ß├sα =df (i) α and ß are contingent, (ii) ß├α, and (iii) each disjunct of αmdnf is a sub-conjunction of some disjunct of ßmdnf. 
 
Something like this definition has been proposed independently in Stelzner 
(1992), Section 3.1, hence we use '├s' to designate the (D3) relation of being a 
Stelzner consequence. 
 
 While Stelzner (1992) provides a syntactical definition for a propositional 
language similar to L he does not propose any definition for quantificational 
languages, nor does he consider any model-theoretic analogs of his definition.  
However, we may apply (D3) to the quantificational language L' provided we 
again make recourse to the resources of propositional infinitary logics and form 
αmdnf for arbitrary wff α of L' by putting Dev(α), as defined in Section 3. above, 
into minimal disjunctive normal form.  This yields the result, for instance, that 
'(∃x)(FxvGx)' is a Stelzner consequence of '(x)(Fx&Gx)' since '(∃x)(FxvGx)'mdnf 
is '(Fa1 v Ga1 v Fa2 v Ga2 v .....Fan v Gan v .....)' and  
'(x)(Fx&Gx)'mdnf is '(Fa1 & Ga1 & Fa2 & Ga2 & .....Fan & Gan & .....)' and every 
disjunct of the former is a sub-conjunction of the one single disjunct of the later. 
  
We may define a model theoretic analog of (D3) for both the propositional 
language L and the quantificational language L' by first defining the notion of a 
minimal model of arbitrary wff α as follows 
 
(D4.1) P is an minimal model of wff α =df P is a partial interpretation such 
that for any full interpretation P' that is an extension of P, P' is a 
                                                          
7Ideally, logically equivalent disjuncts would be eliminated in favor of some canonical 
equivalent. Thus mdnf of '(p&q)vr' would not be '(p&q)v(q&p)vr' but '(p&q)vr'.  But 
nothing substantive hangs on this refinement. 
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model of α, and there is no proper-sub-interpretation P'' of P such 
that for every full interpretation P''' that is an extension of P'', P''' is a 
model α. 
 
Note, where (D4.1) is applied to wffs of L, interpretations and partial 
interpretations are defined as in Section 2. above, that is, as assignments to the 
propositional variables of L.  Where (D4.1) is applied to wffs of L', interpretations 
and partial interpretations are defined as in Section 4. above, that is, as 
assignments to (closed) atomic wffs of L. 
 
 Thus we have the model theoretic definition of Stelzner consequence: 
 
(D4) ß╞sα =df α and ß are contingent, ß╞α, and every minimal model of α 
has an extension which is a minimal model of ß. 
 
We have a correctness and completeness proof for (D3) and (D4) which applies 
for both wffs of L and L'. 
 
Theorem 9:  For any wffs α and ß, ß╞sα iff ß╞sα. 
 
Proof: Cf. definitions (D3) and (D4) and note that (i) each minimal model of α 
uniquely characterizes and is uniquely characterized by a unique disjunct of 
αmdnf, (ii) each minimal model of ß uniquely characterizes and is uniquely 
characterized by a unique disjunct of ßmdnf and (iii) a minimal model m of α has 
an extension which is a minimal model m' of ß iff the disjunct of αmdnf which 
characterizes m is a sub-conjunction of the disjunct of ßmdnf that characterizes 
m'. 
 
Proofs of theorems 2, 3, and 4 could be suitable amended to demonstrate that 
(D4) applied to both the propositional language L and the quantificational 
language L' is reflexive over contingent wffs of L and L', transitive for both L and 
L', and allows for substitution of logical equivalents. 
 
 (D4), and hence (D3), has the consequence that (non-tautologous) 
disjunctions of Stelzner consequences count as Stelzner consequences. Thus 
we have the theorem: 
 
Theorem 10: If ß╞sα and ß╞sσ and ┌(αvσ)┐ is not a tautology then  
ß╞s(αvß). 
 
Proof:  Suppose ß╞sα and ß╞sσ and ┌(αvσ)┐ is not a tautology. 
Then α, σ and ß are contingent and ß╞α and ß╞σ.  So ß╞(αvσ) and hence, 
since ß is not a contradiction, 
┌
(αvσ)┐ is contingent.  Now any minimal model 
for 
┌
(αvσ)┐ is either an minimal model for α or an minimal model for σ, so 
given ß╞sα and ß╞sσ, any minimal model for ┌(αvσ)┐ has an extension 
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which is a minimal model for ß, so ß╞s(αvσ).  
 
The proof of Theorem 10 holds equally for (D4) applied to wffs of L and L'. 
 
 Every content-consequence of a given wff is a Stelzner consequence of 
that wff.  To prove this for propositional language L we let 
┌
At(α)┐ designate the 
set of atomic wffs occurring in α and ┌RAt(α)┐ designate the set of atomic wffs 
that are relevant to α and make use of the following lemma derivable from 
Theorem 13 in the appendix below and Theorem 1 of Gemes (1994); 
 
Lemma 1: For any L wffs α and ß, ß├cα by (D1) iff α and ß are contingent and 
ß├α and there is some σ such that σ┤├α and there is no ø such that 
ß├ø├σ, σ├/ø and At(ø) ⊆At(α).  
 
Theorem 11: For any L wffs α and ß, if ß├cα then  ß├sα 
 
Proof: We prove Theorem 11 by reductio.  Suppose ß├cα and ß├/sα 
       Then ß├α.  Let ßj be any disjunct of ßmdnf.  Then ßj├ß, so ßj├α.  
Since ßj is a disjunct of ßdnf, ßj is a conjunction of atomic wffs and negated 
atomic wffs, and hence, since ßj├α, there must be at least one minimal sub-
conjunction Bk of ßj, such that ßk├α.  So ßk is a disjunct of αmdnf.  So each 
disjunct of ßmdnf entails some disjunct of αmdnf.  Let α* be the conjunction of all 
the disjuncts αk of αmdnf such that for some disjunct ßj of ßmdnf, ßj├k.  So 
ßmdnf├α*. Now since α* is just a sub-disjunction of  mdnf, α├α*├αmdnf.  Since, 
ß├/sα there is some disjunct αs of ααmdnf such that for every disjunct ßj of 
ßmdnf, ßj├/αs.  So α* does not contain αs as a disjunct.  Now suppose for some 
disjunct αx of α*, αs├αx.  Then since αs and αx are both disjuncts of αmdnf αx├αs, otherwise αx would be a proper sub-disjunction of αs, in which case, 
since αx├α, αs could not be a disjunct of αmdnf.  So for every disjunct αx of α*, αs├/αx.  So αs├/α*.  Now since αs is a disjunct of αmdnf, αs├αmdnf.  So αmdnf├/α*, so α├/α*.  Since ßmdnf├α*, ß├α*.  So ß├α*├α and α├/α*.  Now 
consider any σ such that σ┤├α.  Since α* is a sub-disjunction of αmdnf, and 
At(αmdnf) ⊆ At(αdnf) and At(αdnf) = RAt(α), At(α*)⊆ RAt(α).  Now since σ┤├α, 
RAt(α) = RAt(σ). So At(α*)⊆ RAt(σ).  And since RAt(σ) ⊆ At(σ), At(α*)⊆ At(σ).  
So for any σ┤├α, ß├α*├σ, σ├/α* and At(α*)⊆At(σ).  So, by Lemma 1, ß├/cα.8
 
The converse of Theorem 11 does not hold.  The following are cases of Stelzner 
consequences that do not count as content consequences, 
 
              p&q├spvq                      p&q├/cpvq                      
8 This proof would also suffice to show that for wffs of L', if ß├cα then ß├sα provided 
that a analog of Lemma 1 could be proven for wffs of L' and '├' is given a "substitutional 
reading". 
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             (x)Fx├s( ∃x)Fx               (x)Fx├/c( ∃x)Fx 
               p≡q├sp→q                       p≡q├/cp→q 
   
 For certain purposes the content relationship seems more useful then the 
Stelzner consequence relationship.  Forexample, suppose we are trying to define 
the notion of partial truth.9  If we say the 'p≡q' is partially true where it has a true 
Stelzner consequence then we get the result that where 'p' is false and 'q' is true 
then 'p≡q' is partially true, since under these circumstances 'p≡q's Stelzner 
consequence 'p→q' is true.  Indeed, where partial truth is defined as having a 
true Stelzner consequence, 'p≡q' is always partially true since it is always the 
case that one of its Stelzner consequences 'p→q' or 'q→p' is true.  
   
 Stelzner himself is particularly concerned with applications to Deontic 
logic.  For instance, where 'O' is an obligation operator he wishes to avoid the 
inference from 'O(p)' to 'O(pvq)'.  Part of the reason for avoiding this inference is 
that it leads to problems with the notion of derived obligations.  
 
 However it seems plausible to say that one might equally reject the 
inference from 'O(p≡q)' to 'O(~pvq)'.  For instance, one might question the move 
from 'You ought to give your niece a Christmas present if and only if you give 
your nephew a Christmas  present' to 'You ought to not give your niece a 
Christmas present or give your Nephew a Christmas present. 
 
 Indeed, Stelzner develops his notion of consequence in order to preserve 
the condition (Stelzner 1992, p.196), 
 
(PRC)  Positive Relevance Condition:  Minimally (at least partially) fulfilling a 
derived norm implies minimally  (at least partially) fulfilling a basic norm. 
 
Yet clearly if I give my nephew a Christmas present (NE) and do not give my 
niece one (~NI), thus fulfilling the norm O(~NIvNE) derived from the basic norm 
O(NI≡NE), then I have not partially fulfilled that basic norm.  Furthermore, under 
the Stelzner notion of consequence, no mater what I do I will be at least partially 
fulfilling the basic norm O(NI≡NE) since whatever I do will fulfill at least one of the 
two derived norms O(~NIvNE) and O(Niv~NE).  
 
Despite these differences, by and large, the content notion of consequence and 
the Stelzner notion of consequence are so close together that for many purposes 
they serve equally well. 
 
 
7. Alternative Notions 2: Relevant Consequences 
 
Paul Weingartner and Gerhard Schurz, individually and often together, have 
                                                          
9  This is not a purpose suggested in Stelzner (1991). 
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written a series of illuminating articles, for example, Weingartner and Schurz 
(1986), (1987), Schurz (1991), (1991a), Weingartner (1988), exploring a family of 
consequence relations that share the content relationships strictures about the 
transition from wff α to the disjunction  ┌(α v ß)┐.  While Schurz and Weingartner 
have proposed various non-equivalent consequence relations, for our purposes it 
will suffice to concentrate on what Schurz calls the relation of being a relevant 
consequence, which we symbolize as 'ß├rα' and define as follows, 
 
(D5) ß├rα =df ß├α and there is no n-ary predicate in α that is replaceable in 
some of its occurrences in α by a new predicate of the same 
arity (not occurring in α or ß) salva validitate of α├ß. 
 
For the purposes of applying (D5) to wffs of propositional languages we can take 
propositional constants such as 'p' to be 0-ary predicates. 
 
 The relation of being a relevant consequence is not reflexive, for instance, 
'pvp' is not a relevant consequence of itself.  Nor is it transitive, for instance, 
'(pvq)&(pvr)' is a relevant consequence of 'pv(q&r)' which itself is a relevant 
consequence of '(pvq)&r', but '(pvq)&(pvr)' is not a relevant consequence of 
'(pvq)&r'.  Nor is it closed under substitution of classical logical equivalence, for 
instance, 'p' is a relevant consequence of 'p' but 'p's classical logical equivalent 
'p&(pvq)' is not a relevant consequence of 'p'.  The relation of being a relevant 
consequence is not conservative under the addition of logical operators to a 
language.  For instance, while in L~v&→, '(p→q)&(q→p)' is not a relevant 
consequence of 'p&q', in L~v&→≡, where 
┌α≡ß┐ is defined as abbreviating 
┌
(α→ß)&(ß→α)┐, '(p≡q)' is, according to (D5), a relevant consequence of 'p&q'.10  
For this later reason Schurz and Weingartner generally work with languages not 
including a material equivalence operator.11  The relevant consequence relation 
does not lend itself to any transparent model-theoretic analysis in the manner, for 
example, of our (D2) definition of the content relationship.12   
 
 Many content consequences count as relevant consequences, for 
instance, for each of the following pairs of wffs the second counts as both a 
relevant consequence and a content consequence of the first: 
 
10 As noted out by a referee from this journal, Schurz (1991), p.415, points out that this 
true only for the addition of logical equivalence and exclusive disjunction and that the 
concept of relevant consequence is invariant with respect to any subset of the primitive 
operators {~,v,&,→}. 
11  Such an operator could of course be countenanced provided before determining 
relevant consequences of arbitrary wff α via (D5) all occurrences of '≡' were eliminated 
in favor of constructions in terms of, say, '→'. 
12 Schurz (1991a, p.77) does in fact offer a semantics for relevant implication after 
observing that "[t]his semantics cannot be the usual one.  This follows from the fact that 
R1-relevant implication is not closed under substitution."    
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 <(p&q),p>, <(p&(rv~r),p>, <((p&q)v(r&s)),(pvr)>, <(~p&(pvq)),q>, 
<(x)Fx,Fa>, <(x)(Fx&Gx),(x)Fx>,  <(Fa&(a=b)),Fb>, <(Fa&~Fb),(a≠b)>.             
 
 For many pairs of wffs while the second is a classical consequence of the 
first it is neither a content consequence or a relevant consequence of the first, for 
instance: 
 
 <p,(pvq)>, <(p&(pvq)),(pvq)>, <(p&q),(pvq)>, <q,(p→q)>, 
            <~p, (p→q)>, <(x)Fx,(x)(FxvGx)>. 
 
 There are cases of content consequences that do not count as relevant 
consequences.  These invariably involve wffs with redundant sub-formulas or 
redundant occurrences of a given vocabulary.  Thus consider the following pairs 
where the second counts as content consequence but not a relevant 
consequence of the first: 
 
 <p,(p&(pvq)>, <p,(pvp)> 
 
 Where a content consequence is free of all such redundancies it is a 
relevant consequence.  Now the dnf of any wff is in fact free of all such 
redundancies. Thus we have the theorem, 
 
Theorem 12:  For any wffs α and ß of L, if ß├cα then for some σ,  σ┤├α and 
ß├rσ. 
 
Proof:  Suppose ß├cα.  Then ß├αdnf.  Now we show thαat if one or more 
occurrence of a propositional variable n αdnf is replaced with a propositional 
variable not occurring in either αdnf or ß then ß does not entail the resultant 
formula.  Thisby (D5) suffices to show that ß├rαdnf.    Let ø be any propositional 
variable in αdnf.  Let σ be any propositional variable that occurs in neither αdnf 
or ß.  Let αi be any disjunct of αdnf.  Let αdnf/αi/ø:σ be the wff that results from 
replacing the occurrence of ø (or ~ø) in αi in αdnf by σ and let αi/ø:σ be the wff 
that results from replacing the occurrence of ø (or ~ø) in αi by σ.  Now let ßj be 
one of the disjuncts of ß such that ßj├αi.  Now αi├~(αdnf - αi), where (αdnf - αi) 
is αdnf without the disjunct αi.  So ßj├~(αdnf - αi).  Now since ~σ├~(αi/ø:σ), 
ß&~σ├~(αdnf - αi)&~(αi/ø:σ).  But ~(αdnf - αi)&~(αi/ø:σ) is just ~αdnf/αi/ø:σ.  So 
ß├~αdnf/αi/ø:σ.  So ß├_/αdnf/αi/ø:σ. 
   
 Theorem 12 holds also for wffs of L'.  To prove this we would need to 
again avail ourselves of the resources of the propositional fragment of infinitary 
logics and construe '├' substitutionally and replace reference to propositional 
variables in the proof with reference to (closed) atomic wffs 
 
 What theorem 12 tells us is that where α is a content part of ß there is 
some σ logical equivalent to α such that σ is a relevant consequence of ß. There 
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are cases of relevant consequence that do not count as content consequences. 
The following are some noteworthy cases:  
 
Case 1. (p&q)v(~p&~q)├r(pv~q) 
Case 2. (pvq)&r├rpv(q&r) 
Case 3.  (p→q)&(q→p)&(s→p)&(r→q)├r(s→q)&(r→p) 
Case 4. Fa├r(∃x)Fx 
Case 5. (x)Fx├r(∃ x)Fx 
Case 6. Fa├r a=b→Fb.
13
 
 Note, '(p&q)v(~p&~q)' in Case 1 and '(p→q)&(q→p)' in Case 3 can both be 
replaced by 'p≡q' in languages with the material equivalence operator '≡'.  Also, 
each of cases 1-3 have various quantificational analogs.  For instance, as a 
quantificational analog of Case 3 we have, 
 
Case 3a. (x)(Rx≡Sx)&(x)(Px→Rx)&(x)(Hx→Sx)├r(x)(Hx→Rx)&(x)(Px→Sx).  
 
 These type of cases provide divergent results in applications to various 
problems. 
 
Verisimilitude: Schurz and Weingartner have employed the notion of relevant 
consequence in order to rehabilitate Popper's definition of verisimilitude.  Gemes 
(1991) employs the notion of content parts for similar ends.   
 
Let 
┌
XT
┐
 name what Poppers calls the truth content of T, that is, the set of all 
true (classical) consequences of theory X, and 
┌
XF
┐
 name what Popper calls the 
falsity content of T, that is, the set of all false (classical) consequences of theory 
X.  Then the following is Popper's definition of verisimilitude: 
 
(D5) Assuming that truth-content and falsity-content of two theories 
T1 and T2 are comparable, T2 has more verisimilitude than T1 iff 
 
          (a) T1T⊆T2T & T2F⊂T1F 
 
       or 
 
          (b) T1T⊂T2T & T2F⊆T1F 
 
Pavel Tichy (1974), John Harris (1974), and David Miller (1974), have shown that 
(D5) has the consequence that if T2 is false than for any T1, T2 is not closer to 
the truth than T1.  As if this result were not bad enough, we should also note that 
13 An unnamed referee from this journal informed  me that in various manuscripts Schurz 
eliminates '=' in favor of certain congruence relations, in which case 'a=b Fb' does not 
counts as a relevant consequence of 'Fa'.  Schurz himself reports that this is true of his 
Habilitation, Schurz (1989), and in a book manuscript currently under review. 
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(D5) has the horrendous consequence that for any (finitely axiomatizable) T1, 
true or false, if T1 does not entail every truth then T1 does not have more 
verisimilitude than its negation - which, for convenience, we symbolize as '~T1'.14
 
Proof: Let T1 be any arbitrary (finitely axiomatizable) theory such that 
there is some truth t such that T1├/t. Now consider 
┌
(t v ~T1)
┐
.  Since t is true 
┌
(t 
v ~T1)
┐
 is true.  So clearly (t v ~T1)∈~T1T.  Yet (t v ~T1)∉/T1T, otherwise T1├(t v 
~T1), and hence T1├t, contra our choice of t.  Therefore ~T1T  ⊆T1T.  Therefore 
T1 does not have more verisimilitude than ~T1.  
  
 Both the Tichy-Harris-Miller result and the result demonstrated above can 
be avoided if the definition of the truth (falsity) content of a theory is framed in 
terms of true (false) relevant consequences or true (false) content 
consequences.  For instance, if one does not allow true but non-relevant 
consequences into the truth content of a theory the above proof is blocked since 
┌
(t v ~T1)
┐
 would not then be part of the truth content of ~T1.  Similarly, the 
restriction of the truth content to true content consequences also eliminates 
┌
(t v 
~T1)
┐
 as part of the truth content of ~T1. 
 
 However, where one uses the notion of relevant consequences to 
rehabilitate the definition of verisimilitude one gets various undesirable results.15
 
 For instance, one gets the result that any basic wff of the form 
┌
σø
┐
 or 
┌
~σø
┐
, where σ is a predicate and ø is a individual constant of the relevant 
language, does not have any more verisimilitude than its negation, provided at 
least one thing lacks ø and one thing has ø.  For example, 'Boston  is in 
America', symbolically 'Ab', has no more verisimilitude than its negation, '~Ab', 
since the later but not the former has as part of its truth content 'Something is not 
in America', '(∃x)~Ax)’. 
     
 For instance, one gets the result that, for any atomic wffs 'p' and 'q', where 
'p' is true and 'q' is false, the true claim 'p≡~q’ does not have more verisimilitude 
than the false claim 'p≡q'.  This is so because were truth content is defined in 
terms of true relevant consequences and 'p' is true 'pv~q' counts as part of the 
truth content of 'p≡q' but not part of the truth content of 'p≡~q’.Thus one gets the 
result that the claim 'Carter was President of America if and only if it is not the 
case that Gorbachev was Prime Minister of England' has no more verisimilitude 
than the claim 'Carter was President of America if and only if Gorbachev was 
14 Where T1 is a finitely axiomatizable theory we can understand '~T1' as the negation of 
the conjunction of all the axioms of T1' where T1' is a finite axiomatization of T1.   
15  In their various reformulations of the definition of verisimilitude, for instance, in 
Schurz (1991) and Weingartner and Schurz (1987), Weingartner and Schurz make 
recourse to the notion of relevant consequent elements which in turn is defined in terms 
of relevant consequences.  However this refinement does not affect any of the counter-
examples dealt with here. 
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Prime Minister of England'.16   
 
 For instance, one gets the result that where atomic wff 'Fa' is true, 'a=b' is 
false and no individual of the relevant domain lacks the property F, 'Fa' does not 
have any more verisimilitude than `~Fa' since ‘~Fa' has as part of its truth content 
'a=b →~Fb' which is not part of the truth content of 'Fa'.Thus one gets the result 
that where the domain is the set of all physical objects the claim, 'Carter has 
mass' has no more verisimilitude than 'It is not the case that Carter has mass'.17
 
 These unfortunate results are avoided if truth content is defined in terms of 
content consequences rather than relevant consequences. 
 
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation  
 
Schurz (1991), Schurz and Weingartner (1986), Gemes (1990), Grimes (1990), 
and others have noted that classical expressions of hypothetico-deductivism, 
hereafter H-D, such as 
 
(H-D1)  e (directly) confirms T iff T entails e, 
 
yield the result that arbitrary disjunctions may be used to confirm theories.18  For 
instance, suppose one has just observed that Sydney has a harbor bridge.  From 
this one deduces that 'Sydney has a harbor bridge or all the planets travel in 
elliptical orbits' is true which, according to (H-D1), confirms the claim 'All the 
planets travel in elliptical orbits".  Where H-D is framed in terms of relevant or 
content consequences this type of result can be avoided. 
 
 However, framed in terms of relevant consequences H-D produces 
various undesirable results.19    
16 One might claim that where 'p' is true and q is false 'p→~q' does not have any more 
verisimilitude than 'p≡q' since it would be theory progress if 'p≡q's true relevant 
consequence 'q→p' was added to the true 'p≡~q' thus yielding the new truth 'p'.   But then, 
by the same token, for any true 'p' and 'q', one might claim 'p' has no more verisimilitude 
than '~p' since adding '~p's true consequence '~pvq' to the true 'p' yields the new truth 'q'.   
17 Of course where the language in question eschews '=' in favor of a congruence 
relationship this criticism does not apply (Cf. note 14 above). 
18  Schurz (1991) and Weingartner and Schurz (1986) claim that the variant of (H-D) 
they consider has the result that any true contingent e confirms any contingent h.  To get 
this result they appeal to the "condition of strengthening the confirmans": if A confirms T 
and A' is consistent, true (accepted) and logically implies A, then also A' confirms T.  
However this principle is highly suspect, yielding the result, for instance, that given that 
'Die A came up 5' confirms 'Neither Die A nor Die B came up 6', 'Die A came up came 
up 5 and die B came up 5 or 6' confirms 'Both Die A and Die B came up 1,2,3,4, or 
5'. 
19 Schurz (1991) and Weingartner and Schurz (1986) actually suggest formulating H-D in 
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 For instance, H-D reformulated in terms of relevant consequences yields 
the result that observing something that is F confirms the claim 'Fa'  since ‘( ∃x)Fx' 
is a relevant consequence of  'Fa'.  Thus, observing that something is President 
of Russia confirms the claim that Carter is president of Russia.  Note, while H-D 
reformulated in terms of relevant consequences yields the result that '(∃x)Fx' 
confirms 'Fa' it does not yield the result that the stronger 'Fa v Fb' also confirms 
'Fa'.  This seems somewhat paradoxical and indeed violates a constraint on 
hypothetico deductive confirmation advocated by Schurz himself, namely, that if 
S hypothetico-deductively confirms T and S* logically implies S and is consistent 
with T then S* also confirms T.20
 
 Another undesirable result is that one confirms that a lacks property F by 
observing that a is not identical to b or lacks F since 'a≠bvFb' is a relevant 
consequence of 'Fa'.21  So observing that Major is not identical to Clinton or 
Major is not President of America allows one to confirm that Clinton is not 
President of America.   
 
 A further undesirable result is that '(x)(Hx→Rx)&(x)(Px→Sx)' confirms 
'(x)(Rx≡Sx)&(x)(Px→Rx)&(x)(Hx→Sx)' since the later is a relevant consequence 
of the former.  So, the conjunction of the claims 'All humans are rational animals' 
and 'All planets have a roughly spherical shape' confirms the conjunction of 
'Anything is a rational animal if and only if it is roughly spherical in shape' and 'All 
planets are rational' and 'All humans are roughly spherical in shape'.  More 
generally, one has the result that one can confirm that there is a linkage between 
qualities A and C and a linkage between qualities B and D and a linkage between 
qualities C and B by observing a linkage between A and B and a linkage between 
C and D since '(x)(Ax≡Bx)&(x)(Cx≡Dx)' is a relevant consequence of 
'(x)(Ax≡Cx)&(x)(Bx≡Dx)&(x)(Cx≡Bx)'.  So, for instance, finding that being human 
and being rational are (materially) equivalent and being water and being H2O are 
(materially) equivalent confirms that being human and being H2O are (materially) 
equivalent and being rational and being water are (materially) equivalent and 
being H2O and being rational are (materially) equivalent.   
  
 Where H-D is framed in terms of content consequences none of these 
results is obtainable. 
 
terms of inferences with relevant premises as well are relevant conclusions.  Furthermore, 
Schurz (1994) in response to Gemes (1994), makes recourse to the notion of relevant 
consequence elements.  However none of these details affect the problems discussed 
below. 
20  For more on the pros and cons of this constraint see Schurz (1994) and Gemes 
(1994b).  For more on the problems of combining this constraint with H-D see Gemes 
(1996). 
21 Of course where the language in question eschews '=' in favor of a congruence 
relationship this criticisms do not apply (Cf. note 13 above). 
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Gricean Conversational Maxims:  There are applications for which the notion of 
relevant consequence seems prima facie better suited than the notion of content 
consequence.  For instance, in trying to capture the Gricean maxim of speaking 
informatively it seems more appropriate to enjoin  
 
(I) Utter only relevant consequences of your beliefs 
 
than 
 
(II) Utter only content consequences of your beliefs. 
 
Both (I) and (II) militate against my uttering the claim 'My brother is in Sydney or 
New York' when in fact I believe him to be in New York.  However where I believe 
both that my brother is in Sydney and that he as two children only (I), but not (II), 
militates against my uttering the claim 'My brother is in Sydney AND he has two 
children or he does not have two children'. 
 In this case it is the content consequences property of allowing for 
substitution of classical logical equivalents that causes problems.  While in the 
case just described the uttering of 'My brother is in Sydney' is Grice-admissible, 
the uttering of its classical logical equivalent 'My brother is in Sydney AND he has 
two children or he does not have two children' is presumably not Grice-
admissible.  Earlier we noted that the notion of relevant consequence, unlike the 
notion of content consequence, does not allow for any redundancies.  It is this 
feature that makes the notion of relevant consequence prima facie more suitable 
than that of content consequence for capturing Gricean maxims.22
22 However, as noted in footnote 4. above, we may construct a notion of content that does 
not treat logical equivalents equivalently.  Such a notion of content would be a serious 
competitor with the notion of relevant consequence for application to the problem of 
formalizing Gricean conversational maxims.  Thus suppose, for instance, that αdnf was 
defined in terms of the full vocabulary of α rather than merely the essential vocabulary of 
α.  Then the dnf form of '(p&(qv~q)' would be '(p&q)v(p&~q)' and the dnf of '(p&q)' 
would be '(p&q)'.  So, applying this definition of dnf to (D1) we get the result that  while 
'p' is a content part of '(p&q)', its logical equivalent '(p&(qv~q)' is not a content part of 
'(p&q)'.  Alternatively, we could simply try to capture the Gricean norm by specifying  
 
(III) Utter only concise content consequences of your beliefs. 
 
A content consequence α of a belief set is concise iff there is no wff ⌠, such that ⌠ is 
logically equivalent to α and ⌠ is shorter than α.  Note, both (II) and (III), unlike (I)  
militate against uttering "Jones should give his daughter a Christmas present or not give 
his son one" where one believes "Jones should give his daughter a Christmas present if 
and only if he gives his son one".  Similarly, both (II) and (III), but not (I), militate 
against uttering 'Someone owns a Ford' where one believes 'Jones owns a Ford', or 
uttering 'Someone should exercise their right to vote' where one believes 'Everyone 
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 Both the content notion of consequence and the notion of relevant 
consequence represent restrictions of the classical notion of consequence; they 
are partitions of the classical consequence relation.  Which is preferable is best 
answered with respect to the particular applications one has in mind.23
 
should exercise their right to vote'. 
23  This paper has been greatly improved through the comments and criticisms provided 
by an unnamed referee from this journal. 
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Appendix
 
We now show that the following definition of content for wffs of L: 
 
(D1*) ß├cα=df (i) α and ß are contingent, (ii) ß├α, and (iii) there is no µ such 
that µ is a proper sub-disjunction of αdnf and ß├µ, 
 
given as BCPL1 in Gemes (1994), is equivalent to our definition for wffs of L 
 
(D1) ß├cα=df (i) α and ß are contingent, (ii) ß├α, and (iii) each disjunct of αdnf is a sub-conjunction  of some disjunct of ßdnf 
 
given above. 
 
 Before proving that (D1*) and (D1) are equivalent we need to consider 
some lemmas.  In the following lemmas we use 
┌
At(σ)
┐
 to signify the set of 
atomic wffs occurring in wff σ 
 
Lemma 13.1 ß├cα by (D1*), At(αdnf)⊆ At(ßdnf). 
 
  Proof: Cf.Lemma 2.1 of Gemes (1994). 
 
Lemma 13.2 For any (contingent) wff α, and any disjunct αj of αdnf,  At(αj) = 
At(αdnf).   
 
Proof: Cf. the construction of αdnf. 
 
Lemma 13.3  Where ß├cα by (D1*), for any disjunct αk of αdnf and  
           any disjunct ßj of ßdnf, At(αk) ⊆At(ßj). 
 
Proof: This follows from lemmas 13.1 and 13.2. 
 
Lemma 13.4 For any wffs σ and µ, where σ and µ are conjunctions of atomic wffs 
and negated atomic wffs if At(σ)⊆At(µ) and σ is not a sub-conjunction 
of µ then σ├~µ. 
 
Proof: Assume σ and µ are conjunctions of atomic wffs and negated atomic wffs, 
At(σ)⊆At(µ), and σ is not a sub-conjunction of µ. 
 
  Since σ and µ are conjunctions and σ is not a sub-conjunction of µ, 
σ contains some conjunct α that is not a conjunct of µ.  Now since σ is a 
conjunction of atomic and negated atomics α is an atomic wff or a negated 
atomic wff.  Let ß be the atomic wff that occurs in α, in other words α is ß or α is 
┌
~ß
┐
.  Now since At(σ) ⊆At(µ), the atomic wff ß occurs in µ.   
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 Now suppose α is ß. Then ß is not a conjunct of µ, since α is ex hypothesi 
not a conjunct of µ.  Now since the atomic wff ß occurs in µ and µ is just a 
conjunction of atomic wffs and negated atomic wffs then where ß is not a 
conjunct of µ, 
┌
~ß
┐
 is a conjunct of µ.  So where α is ß, σ├ß and µ├~ß, so σ├~µ.   
 
  Now suppose α is ┌~ß┐.  Then ┌~ß┐ is not a conjunct of µ, since α is 
ex hypothesi not a conjunct of µ.  Now since the atomic wff ß occurs in µ and µ is 
just a conjunction of atomic wffs and negated atomic wffs then where 
┌
~ß
┐
 is not 
a conjunct of µ, ß is a conjunct of µ.  So where α is ┌~ß┐, σ├~ß and µ├ß, so 
σ├~µ. 
 
Lemma 13.5 Where s is a proper sub-disjunction of αdnf then where  αk is 
disjunct of αdnf that is not a disjunct of s  then αk├~s. 
 
Proof: Assume s is a proper sub-disjunction of αdnf and  αk is disjunct of αdnf 
that is not a disjunct of s.  Now let αj be any disjunct of αdnf other than αk.  Then 
since each disjunct of αdnf is a conjunction of atomic wffs and negated atomic 
wffs and each disjunct contains the same atomic wffs and each disjunct is 
unique, αk├~αj. So since s is just a disjunction of such αj, αk├~s. 
 
We are now in a position to prove: 
 
Theorem 13: ß├cα by (D1) iff ß├cα by (D1*). 
 
Proof: We assume α and ß are contingent and ß├α otherwise the case is trivial. 
  Now we show that if  ß├cα by (D1*) then ß├cα by (D1) by reductio.  
Suppose  ß├/cα by (D1) and ß├cα by (D1*).  Let (α1v...vαm) be αdnf and 
(ß1v...vßm) be ßdnf.  Then since  ß├/cα by (D1) for some disjunct αk of 
(α1v...vαm) there is no disjunct ßj of (ß1v...vßm) such that αk is a sub-
conjunction of ßj.  Now since  ß├cα by (D1*), for each disjunct ßj of (ß1v...vßm), 
At(αk)At(ßj) - cf. lemma 13.3.  Now for any disjunct ßj of (ß1v...vßm), ßj is just  
a conjunction of atomics wffs and negated atomic wffs and αk, being a disjunct of 
a αdnf, is also just a conjunction of atomics wffs and negated atomic wffs, so 
since At(αk)⊆ At(ßj) and αk is not a sub-disjunction of ßj, αk├~ßj - cf. lemma 
13.4. So αk├~(ß1v...vßm). So αk├~ß.  So ß├~αk.  Now since ß├α, 
ß├(α1v...vαm).  Now since αk is a conjunct of (α1v...vαm) and ß├~αk and 
ß├(α1v...vαm), ß├(α1v..vαk-1vαk+1v...vαm) - that is (α1v...vαm) less its disjunct αk.  Now since each disjunct of αdnf is unique (α1v..vαk-1vαk+1v...vαm) is a 
proper sub-disjunction of (α1v...vαm). So  ß├/cα by (D1*) contra our initial 
supposition. 
 
  Now we show that if ß├cα by (D1) then ß├cα by (D1*) by proving 
its contrapositive.  Suppose ß├/cα by (D1*).  Then for some proper sub-
disjunction s of αdnf, ß├s.  Let αk be some disjunct of αdnf that is not a disjunct 
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of s.  Then αk├~s - cf lemma 13.5.  So αk├ ~ß and for each disjunct ßj of ßdnf, 
ßj├ß, so αk├ ~ßj.  Now since αk is consistent and for each disjunct ßj of ßdnf, αk├~ßj, αk is not a sub-conjunction of any disjunct of ßdnf.  So ß├/cα by (D1).   
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